

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE FULLY INTEGRATED WING (AC/ANG)—DOES THE AIR FORCE HAVE IT RIGHT?

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ABSTRACT

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What is the Total Force and Fully Integrated Wing concept and does the United States Air Force have it right? The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to analyze the Fully Integrated Wing concept focusing on leadership challenges with Title 10 and Title 32 Airmen within the same organization, what missions or types of wings are best suited for the Total Force concept, and provide recommendations on an effective approach to integrate the active and reserve components (AC/RC) Total Force to meet the future needs and capabilities of the United States Air Force.

THE FULLY INTEGRATED WING (AC/ANG)—DOES THE AIR FORCE HAVE IT RIGHT?

"Without the daily contributions made by our Reserve forces around the world, we simply could not accomplish our missions and protect our national interests, Total Force integration is not a luxury - it is a vital necessity."¹

--Charles L. Cragin, former Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).

What is the Total Force and Fully Integrated Wing concept and does the United States Air Force have it right? The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to analyze the Fully Integrated Wing concept focusing on leadership challenges with Title 10 and Title 32 Airmen within the same organization, what missions or types of wings are best suited for the Total Force concept, and provide recommendations on an effective approach to integrate the active and reserve components (AC/RC) Total Force to meet the future needs and capabilities of the United States Air Force. For the purpose of this research project, I will focus primarily on the Air National Guard integration with the active component (AC).

Background on Total Force Concept

The Total Force concept originated with former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Melvin R. Laird. He published the "Total Force" policy in 1970. "Laird, in his application of this established process, simply stated that providing for active force shortfalls by increasing the planned use of Guard and Reserve forces would enable the nation to maintain higher force levels at the same cost, or the same force levels at less cost."² The policy by former SecDef Laird is recognized as the origin of the Total Force concept. Former SecDefs James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and William Perry continued to evolve the Total Force concept in the areas of manning, equipping, training, facilities, access to modern weapon systems, and program funding.³ The concept continued to evolve over the years but as long as military budgets were very large through the end of the Cold War, the reserve component (RC) continued to be a force available to augment the AC, however, they were far from an integrated Total Force. The memorandum from SecDef Cohen in September 1997 titled "Seamless Total Force Policy" was the next big push in the Total Force concept. The main thrust of SecDef Cohen's policy was to create a unity of effort among the AC and RC leaders in order to eliminate any remaining cultural and structural barriers that would hinder the effective integration of the AC and RC.⁴ "This memorandum is significant because it sets the tone for how we must work as a Total Force as we move into the 21st century. It recognizes that in the post-Cold War world, we are having to rely on our Reserves more and more."⁵

The Air Force definition of transformation is “a process by which the military achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.”⁶ The selection of the AC/RC organizational structure is a large part of Air Force transformation. “Since the Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty seamlessly form integrated operational wings in combat, the Air Force is exploring this type of integration at home through Total Force organizational constructs.”⁷ The Air Force continues to transform in the post Cold War environment. “To alleviate pressures created by post-cold war downsizing and an unexpected growth in smaller but diverse regional commitments, the Air Force established the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept as a means to provide forces and support on a rotational, and thus, a relatively more predictable basis.”⁸ The AEF employs a 20-month cycle during which two AEFs are designated as lead for a 120-day eligibility period. The remaining eight AEFs are simultaneously engaged in maintaining readiness.”⁹ The AEF concept has become part of Air Force culture. The Air Force normally does not deploy without the support from the RC Airmen, so the focus of the vision is how can the Air Force better integrate the AC and RC at all levels to form a more effective combat force to support the Combatant commanders?¹⁰ “AEF scheduling makes it more feasible for the RC forces to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical advantage of the AEF.”¹¹ Civilian employment availability is a key element in any future Total Force organization. The organizational structure must capitalize on the strength of the RC which is the part-time citizen Airman. As the Department of Defense has continued with the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process pressure has increased to consolidate the AC and RC within the same installation. The next logical step is to train like we fight and combine the AC and RC into one organization.

Currently there are three Total Force organizational options to integrate the AC and RC unit in the Air Force.

Classic Associate is an “integration model where an active duty component unit retains principal responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one or more reserve component units. **Active and reserve component units retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.**”¹²

Active Associate is the same as a classic associate except it is an “integration model where a **reserve component** unit has principal responsibility for weapon system or systems which is shares with one or more active duty units.”¹³

Fully integrated also known as “blended” is an “integration model where members from different components comprise a single organization, falling under the **same chain of command**.”¹⁴

Faced with these organizational models, the Air Force selected the Fully Integrated option as the first Total Force Wing in the Air Force as the Georgia Air National Guard (ANG) blended with the AC at Robins Air Force Base and were tasked to accomplish the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) mission.

First Fully Integrated/Blended Air Force Wing

“The creation of the Active and Guard blended unit, the 116th Air Control Wing at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, was a truly transformational step taking integration to the next level.”¹⁵ “Integrating at the 116th Wing is just the first step. The Air Force will...develop options to better leverage all Air Force capabilities and expand Associate Unit programs and Blended Wing initiatives.”¹⁶ The selection of the standard Total Force organizational structure will have a direct impact on combat and mobility readiness in the Air Force. I will address which future Total Force model, Associate or Fully Integrated, should be selected by the Air Force in my recommendations.

In June 2001, SecDef Rumsfeld issued Program Budget Directive (PBD) 824 which would reduce the B-1 bomber fleet down to 60 aircraft by FY-02 and relocate all B-1 bombers to active duty bases. In a 17 October 2001 letter, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche directed that the 116th Bomb Wing, a Georgia ANG B-1 unit, will transition to the JSTARS mission with a large active duty presence. Headquarters United States Air Force Air Combat Command was tasked to work out the details.¹⁷

“The Georgia Air National Guard redesignated the 116th Bomb Wing here at Robins AFB as the 116th Air Control Wing (ACW) on 1 October 2002 after a historic ceremony which also served to inactivate the active-duty 93d ACW. On that day the mission of the 93d became that of the new 116th ACW. The ceremony officially marked the joining of personnel and resources from each wing and the creation of the first ever “blended wing,” a mixture of both ANG and active-duty personnel under one commander. The mission of the new 116th ACW is to provide combat ready personnel, unit and equipment to deploy to support the governor of Georgia and the President of the United States. It is the first ever U.S. Air Force Wing to activate under the Air Force's Future Total Force concept, which will eventually combine U.S. Air Force active-duty and reserve components world wide.”¹⁸

“JSTARS performs theater-wide battle management and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support missions. JSTARS provides radar surveillance and targeting information to component commanders to develop an understanding of the enemy situation and

to support attack operations/targeting.”¹⁹ There is one JSTARS wing with 17 aircraft in the Air Force. Twenty-five percent of the 17 aircraft are normally in depot at any one time so that leaves approximately 13 aircraft to meet Combatant commander and home station requirements. JSTARS is a low density/high demand (LD/HD) asset. LD/HD is defined as “force elements consisting of major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to support worldwide joint military operations.”²⁰ The 116th ACW is the only wing in the Air Force that can fulfill the unique JSTARS missions for a Combatant commander.

The organizational chain of command in the 116th ACW is Fully Integrated. The wing consists of approximately 1,600 AC and 1,200 RC personnel. As of May 2005, the Wing Commander was a Brigadier General from the RC/ANG and the Vice Wing Commander was a Colonel from the AC. There were three Colonels who are Group commanders, one from AC and two from the RC. The squadron commanders, normally Lieutenant Colonels, were approximately sixty percent AC and forty percent RC.

The blended or fully integrated wing has been an operational success in support of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander for OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM. The 116th ACW has deployed continuously since Jan 2003 at various levels. Peak deployment was during the initial months of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) with 9 out of 11 available JSTARS aircraft and approximately 700 personnel deployed in theater. The blended wing on a rotational schedule among the three operational squadrons plus support personnel supports the steady state deployment. The 116th ACW has met this deployment commitment due to the dedication and patriotism of the AC and Georgia ANG Airmen. The unit has not been mobilized and thus all deployments have been voluntary for the ANG/RC Airmen.

Title 10 and Title 32 Leadership Challenges

Two major challenges I want to address are mobilization authority for deployments and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority. AC and RC/ANG Airmen adhere to different sets of laws and regulations while at home station, however, AC and RC/ANG Airmen both adhere to the same set of laws and regulations while deployed for an outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) operation. The RC/ANG Airmen are temporarily moved into active duty or Title 10 status while deployed. Title 10 is the United States code that primarily pertains to the active component of the military, the federal portion of the reserve component, and how the AC interacts with the RC. Title 32 is the United States code that primarily pertains to the

Army and Air National Guard. What is the difference between an ANG/Title 32 and AC/Title 10 Airman? The basic difference is that the Title 32 Airman is in the RC/ANG and is under the command of a state Governor unless mobilized or volunteered into federal Title 10 service while the Title 10 Airman is in the AC and under the command of the President of the United States. Both the AC and RC Airmen are in Title 10 status when deployed for OCONUS operations. The RC consists of the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.²¹ Title 32 Airmen have a State mission in support of the Governor and Federal mission in support of the President.

The first challenge in Fully Integrated/blended Air Force Wings is the mobilization authority for deployments. There are a different set of rules and laws that govern the deployment of AC and RC forces. Title 10, Section 10145 (b) defines ANG personnel as members of Ready Reserve of the U.S. and is the foundation for bringing ANG/Title 32 members onto active duty/Title 10 status:

“(b) The units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States and of the Air National Guard of the United States are in the Ready Reserve of the Army and the Ready Reserve of the Air Force, respectively.”²²

Section 12301 of Title 10 code asserts when a commander can order RC personnel under non-mobilization authority to active status.

“(b) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to **active duty for not more than 15 days a year**. However, units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor of the State.”²³

Therefore, with the minimum deployment length for an LD/HD asset like JSTARS normally much longer than 15 days, the challenge for the commander of a blended organization is to choose between unit mobilization or depend on the volunteerism of the RC Airmen to meet the Combatant commander requirement. Depending on volunteerism is not the ideal situation for a blended unit commander to ensure combat airpower is available for the Combatant commanders. In a fully integrated organization, the unit commander no longer has an AC only or RC only option because the organization needs both to deploy and employ. Title 10, Section 12302 defines mobilization authority as:

"(a) In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty (other than for training) for **not more than 24** consecutive months."²⁴

If the SecDef had mobilized the 116th ACW prior to OIF in January 2003, the mobilization authority would have ceased in January 2005 and the blended unit commander would have been right back in the same position of depending on volunteerism to meet Combatant commander requirements.

The second Title 10 and Title 32 leadership challenge for a blended wing is UCMJ authority. An AC commander in a blended organization does not have UCMJ authority over Title 32/ANG personnel. This creates a unique dynamic to solve non-judicial punishment issues. The AC commander must go to the next higher RC commander and request resolution of the non-judicial punishment. An AC commander only has UCMJ authority over the AC members of the unit and an ANG/RC commander only has UCMJ authority over the ANG/RC members of the unit. This is only an issue while at home station and the ANG personnel are in Title 32 status. While deployed OCONUS, all members are in Title 10 status and the commander whether from the AC or RC, has UCMJ authority over all assigned personnel. The UCMJ states:

"(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:

*(1) **Members of a regular component** of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge...and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it.*

*(3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the **Air National Guard** of the United States **only when in Federal Service**.*"²⁵

"Command is central to all military action and unity of command is central to unity of effort."²⁶

Unity of effort is nothing more than teamwork. According to Webster's dictionary, teamwork is a joint action by a group of people, in which individual interests are subordinated to group unity and efficiency. In sports, a coach who has the authority for the overall strategic direction of the team is required to achieve teamwork. The same applies to a military organization; someone must have the legal authority to command the unit. The blended organizational structure clearly makes it difficult to achieve unity of command and unity of effort.

Fully Integrated/Blended Missions

What wings or missions of the United States Air Force are best suited for the Fully Integrated/blended total force organizational structure? The Air National Guard has three distinct categories of Airmen. They are Active Guard Reserve (AGR), Military Technician (MT), and Traditional Guardsmen (TG). An AGR/MT is a full time RC Airman that is essentially interchangeable from an operational viewpoint with the active counterpart. The Air National Guard FY04 end-strength was 106,822 Airmen which consisted of approximately 3K in training, 34K full-time Guardsmen (AGR and MT), and 70K TG.²⁷ The Traditional Guardsmen, sixty-nine percent of the ANG, is the backbone of the Air National Guard. The TG normally has full time civilian employment in the local community and is available approximately 60 workdays per year unless the individual volunteers for more or the entire unit is mobilized for federal duty. The minimum participation for ANG members is directed in Title 32.

Section 502: "(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall - (1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at least 48 times each year; and (2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year."

To leverage the strength of the TG, the mission assigned must be one that is compatible with civilian employment and a mission that the Air Force has some redundant capability or AC only options. Two major factors that will impact the Traditional Guardsmen are how often and how much time they are away from their civilian employment. In my opinion, the mission best suited for a Total Force organization is one in which the Air Force has some redundancy in aircraft/personnel and the mission can supported by the TG personnel working 1-3 week periods on a rotational basis. A civilian employer normally has more flexibility with short duration absences. Strategic airlift and air refueling are good examples of missions that meet those criteria. The unique aircraft that fall into the LD/HD category are not optimal to leverage the strength of the TG in a blended unit. A LD/HD wing that is fully integrated/blended loses that RC texture. The RC mission is no longer there to augment the AC instead the RC is permanently drafted into the AC. If a Combatant commander requests the unique capabilities of a one of a kind LD/HD asset then the RC Airmen must volunteer for the deployment or the SecDef will activate the unit. SecDef Rumsfeld illustrates this point when he states, "It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on

active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise.”²⁸

Air Force doctrine states that the Air Force has six distinctive capabilities: Air and Space Superiority, Information Superiority, Global Attack, Precision engagement, Rapid Global Mobility, and Agile Combat Support.²⁹ These capabilities are accomplished through seventeen operational functions and weapons systems/personnel that achieve these functions. Some of these functions are accomplished with LD/HD assets. The nature of any unique LD/HD mission is such that the RC essentially becomes part of the AC at the operational level in a fully integrated wing. If the Combatant commander needs a unique LD/HD capability, the blended AC/RC unit must deploy because the SecDef does not have an AC only option. The United States Air Force Staff has produced talking points as a vector for what missions are best suited for the future Total Force organization.

- o “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV); Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); space operations; Air and Space Operations Centers; Contingency Response Groups; Battlefield Airmen and Information Operations, among others
- o Reachback missions allow stateside operations of wartime assets, which can reduce reliance on involuntary mobilization
- o Maintains force to continue stateside training and Homeland Defense”³⁰

The mission and the organizational structure must capitalize on the strength of the ANG which is the part-time citizen Airman. In my recommendations I will address what missions/wings are best suited for the future Total Force organization.

Analysis

“Doctrine is, after all, those beliefs, distilled through experience and passed on from one generation of airmen to the next, that guide what we do; it is our codified practices on how best to employ air and space power.”³¹ Doctrine is the collective best ideas and practices of the Air Force. The criteria from AFD 38-1 may not be “doctrine” but it functions as the best set of criteria to evaluate an organizational structure for the Air Force. “The Air Force must be organized to best use available resources. This requires simple, streamlined structures designed for seamless transition from peace to war. The principal characteristics desired in Air Force organizations are: agility, decentralization, flexibility, mission orientation, unambiguous command, simplicity, and standardization,”³²

“Agility: Organizations should be structured so personnel can recognize problems, find solutions, make decisions, and implement them quickly.

Decentralization: Organizations should be designed so lower echelons can achieve objectives without needing continuous control from above.

Flexibility: Organizations should be capable of adapting rapidly to changing external circumstances.”³³

In my opinion the fully integrated wing structure does not have any significant disadvantages in the areas of decentralization, agility, and flexibility. The fully integrated organization is required to be more agile and flexible due to the lack of integration of the Air Force command structure above the wing level. Above the fully integrated wing level in the Air Force, the ANG/RC and AC have completely separate personnel, finance, mobilization authority, and UCMJ rules/laws. In my opinion the Fully Integrated wing structure has significant disadvantages in the areas of mission orientation, unambiguous command, simplicity, and standardization.

“Mission Orientation: Organizations should have a reason to exist and should be designed to achieve the outcome defined in the applicable mission directive.”³⁴ The Fully Integrated structure in an LD/HD wing is not best suited to support the mission. The Fully Integrated wing must capitalize on the strength of the RC. The RC is an augmentation force, not a front line deployment force. The RC/ANG within a fully integrated wing loses that augmentation texture and essentially is “drafted” onto active duty. The SecDef does not have an AC only option in a Fully Integrated/blended LD/HD wing.

“Unambiguous Command: Organizational structure should provide a clear chain-of-command running from the President to the most junior airman.”³⁵ The Fully Integrated structure is not best suited in this area due to the Title 32 and Title 10 differences in the areas of mobilization authority and UCMJ authority. This goes directly to the heart of unity of command and unity of effort, the two foundations of any military operation.

“Simplicity: Organizational structure should be as plain and straightforward as possible because complexity often inhibits rather than facilitates organizational effectiveness.”³⁶ The Fully Integrated wing has four distinctly different Airmen; AC, AGR, MT, and TG. The AC and RC (AGR, MT, TG) have two different sets of rules/laws that govern each. In addition, within the RC the AGR, MT, and TG all have slightly different “rules of engagement” based on whether they are in active guard or civilian status. So four different categories of Airmen, all

interchangeable at the operational level based on the trained specialty, but governed by different rules/laws based on status or situation falls well short of the “simplicity” standard.

“*Standardization*: Organizations with like responsibilities should have similar organizational structures.”³⁷ The 116th is the only Fully Integrated wing in the Air Force. “New organizational constructs will leverage the strengths inherent in all components. There will be various models of integration, all based on the **associate model**.”³⁸ This quote from a talking paper on future Total Force from Air Force Staff seems to indicate that the Air Force has made the decision that all future Total Force organizations will be some sort of associate model. If this assumption is true, then it is only a matter of time before the 116th ACW goes through an “unblending” to become an associate organization. This would make the Fully Integrated wing very much “non-standard” for the Air Force if all future total force wings will be “some sort of associate model.”

An additional disadvantage is the personnel strain placed on the Traditional Guardsmen. The TG is counted one for one on the blended unit manning document at the 116th ACW. The TG is a part-time asset and should not be counted as a full time asset in the manning document. This accounting combined with the LD/HD unique mission imposes a tremendous strain on the TG/RC. RC (AGR/MT/TG) Airmen at the 116th ACW will potentially deploy 120+ days for the next 10-15 yrs. The AC of the Air Force within the AEF rotation process will normally deploy 72 days per year on average (120 days in 20 month period). The number of days required from the RC/ANG in the 116th ACW appears to be in conflict with the Title 10 intent with reference to the purpose of the reserve components.

“The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and **persons are needed than are in the regular components**.”³⁹

The purpose of the reserve component is to provide persons available for active duty instead of becoming the AC due to LD/HD operational requirements of a Fully Integrated wing. The U.S. Army plans to use the RC at approximately half the rate of the AC. The Army Force Generation model plans for AC forces to deploy 1 of 3 years and the RC forces 1 of 6 years.⁴⁰ The Air Force structure must take a similar approach when using RC forces to augment the AC.

The advantages listed below from the USAF Transformation Flight Plan 2004 are generic advantages of the Total Force concept, not of a particular organization structure within

that concept. These advantages will apply to all Total Force units whether Fully Integrated or associate organizational structure.

“Utilizing Guard members and Reservists in future weapons systems allows the Air Force to substantially increase crew ratios, which will maximize output of these high performance aircraft. Integration will also relieve stress on the Active Duty force and provide a cost effective force multiplier. Finally, it will leverage the high experience levels of the Air RC personnel and enhance retention of Airmen who have decided to leave the AC, saving countless dollars in training expenses.”⁴¹

Recommendations

The Air Force made an aggressive decision when an organization was created that had an integrated AC/RC chain of command without the Title 10 and Title 32 leadership challenges resolved prior to integration. This has created a situation in which a commander must operate within two different systems, AC and ANG/RC simultaneously. Personnel, finance, mobilization authority, UCMJ, and command authority are some of the differences.

“It is an amalgamated force that we’re fighting with today. It is hard to tell who was a reservist, who was an active and who was a National Guardsman.” “It is truly an historic event that we are standing up our finest weapons system, the first **associate** Guard and active wing. This is where the Air Force is going...and it’s going there in a hurry.”⁴²

Air Force Secretary Wynne has it right in his remarks about the new Total Force F-22 unit with the associate AC/ANG structure because the chain of command is separate and this eliminates almost all of the Title 10 and Title 32 leadership challenges at the wing level. In my opinion, the lack of Air Force AC and RC integration outside of the Fully Integrated wing and the Title 10 and Title 32 differences does not allow the Fully Integrated organization to function efficiently.

The Fully Integrated/blended structure is successful at the 116th ACW due to the hard work and dedication of the AC and RC personnel. The RC personnel continue to volunteer at a tremendous rate for a continuous USCENTCOM commitment now entering its fourth year. The bottom line on Fully Integrated Air Force wing is that it is very similar to forcing square pegs into round holes...it will work with an extreme amount of effort. Colonel Mark Hall, former 116th Vice Wing Commander, said it best when explaining daily operations to a General Officer.

“Everything we do at the 116th is hard and if it is not hard it is at least time consuming.”⁴³ This frustration with the lack of integration above the wing level is common. A blended wing structure dilutes the strength of the RC which is the TG. The RC no longer augments the AC, it becomes part of the AC. That is even more amplified in a LD/HD weapons system such as JSTARS.

In my opinion, a LD/HD weapon system with a unique capability/mission is the wrong mission for a blended Total Force unit. SecDef Rumsfeld appears to support that position. "It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise."⁴⁴ The mission must be compatible with and capitalize on the strength of the RC which is the part-time citizen Airman. "Reachback missions allow stateside operations of wartime assets, which can reduce reliance on involuntary mobilization."⁴⁵ The unmanned aerial vehicle platform such as the Predator is a reachback mission and a great fit for the Total Force organization. Strategic attack, Airlift and Air Refueling are other missions that are well suited for the Total Force organization. In my opinion, the two major criteria for Total Force unit mission selection are redundant capability in the AC and compatibility with the part-time citizen Airman's civilian employment requirements. The SecDef must have an AC only option either through redundant capability in another Air Force unit or through an associate structure in the unique LD/HD missions. The LD/HD JSTARS mission within the blended unit structure fails both these criteria.

In my opinion the Air Force has two possible approaches to make the Total Force organization part of the solution instead of part of the problem. One approach is that the Air Force must get the Title 32 and Title 10 differences resolved now which allows a designated RC or AC commander the legal authority to command the unit. This will ensure the commander has the chance to achieve unity of effort and command. The Fully Integrated wing does not afford the commander this opportunity under the current legal constraints. After the Title 32 and 10 issues are resolved, then the Air Force should integrate from the top down not the bottom up. The Air Force Staff, National Guard Bureau, personnel and finance systems should be the first to integrate. This will allow units at the wing level, whether AC or RC, to receive higher headquarters guidance from one location. This will ease the integration of the AC and RC when the wings are the last to integrate.

In the second approach, the Air Force should follow initiatives published by Air Staff's Future Total Force office, "New organizational constructs will leverage the strengths inherent in all components. There will be various models of integration, all based on the associate model."⁴⁶ If all Total Force organizations will be some form of the Associate model, then the Air Force must pay the impending manpower bill to plus up the AC and turn the blended 116th Air Control Wing into a Classic Associate Wing. The associate type structure for LD/HD units is in alignment with USAF Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023. "Air Force planners and programmers will consider the alternatives defined below as they develop new future Total

Force initiatives and organizational constructs: Reserve/Guard Associate Units: RC personnel operationally support AC units. Potential application: Expand existing program into LD/HD mission and “stressed” career fields to reduce personnel strains.”⁴⁷ This will return the RC at the 116th ACW back to an augmentation force instead of a front line deployment force and give the SecDef an AC only option for JSTARS.

Brigadier General Tom Lynn GA ANG, the first 116th ACW commander, said it best as he continually answered questions about the blended wing organization. “It does not matter what kind of organizational structure you have, if you have good people it will work, and we have great people in the 116th.” I agree with BG Lynn. The only reason the blended organization structure at the 116th has met all operational commitments and has provided combat airpower in support of USCENTCOM continuously for 3+ years is the dedication, patriotism of the AC and RC members, and the continued volunteerism of the RC members. “The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the nation’s wars.”⁴⁸ The organizational structure needs to increase combat capability and become part of the solution instead of a major part of the problem.

As a former AC squadron commander in the blended organizational structure, the legislative changes to fix the Title 32 and Title 10 differences are well beyond too difficult. The Air Force should pay the manpower bill and “unblend”/change the 116th ACW into a Classic Associate structure. This action would be in accordance with published guidance from the Air Force Future Total Force office. All future Total Force units should be some type of associate structure with a mission that has redundant capability in the AC and also is compatible with the part-time citizen Airman’s civilian employment requirements.

Endnotes

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² Francis Greenlief, “Structuring the Total Force: Push more power in the Guard, fund modernization, 1997, linked from the Defense Strategy Review Page available at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fgreen.htm> ; internet; accessed 17 Jan 2006.

³ DoD News Release, “Secretary Cohen signs memorandum emphasizing increased reliance on the reserve components”, 11 September 1997, linked from the DoD homepage available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1997/b09111997_bt472-97.html ; internet; accessed 22 January 2006.

⁴ Ibid.

- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ U.S. Air Force, *Transformation Flight Plan 2004*, (Washington D. C.: HQ USAF/XPXC), pg ii.
- ⁷ Ibid, pg 34.
- ⁸ U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, AFDD-1, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 17 November 2003), pg 60.
- ⁹ Transformation Flight Plan 2004, pg 32.
- ¹⁰ *The Air Force Future Total Force home page*, available at <https://www.futuretotalforce.hq.af.mil/overview.cfm> ; internet; accessed 23 Jan 2006.
- ¹¹ Transformation Flight Plan 2004, pg 32.
- ¹² "Classic Associate overview", Linked from *Air Force Future Total Force home page* at https://www.futuretotalforce.hq.af.mil/classic_associate.cfm ; internet; accessed 23 Jan 2006.
- ¹³ "Active Associate overview", Linked from *Air Force Future Total Force home page* at https://www.futuretotalforce.hq.af.mil/active_associate.cfm ; internet; accessed 23 Jan 2006.
- ¹⁴ "Fully Integrated overview", Linked from *Air Force Future Total Force home page* at https://www.futuretotalforce.hq.af.mil/fully_integrated.cfm ; internet; accessed 23 Jan 2006.
- ¹⁵ Transformation Flight Plan 2004, pg 34.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 34.
- ¹⁷ Briefing slides from 116 ACW wing brief, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, May 2004.
- ¹⁸ "116th ACW History", Linked from the *116th ACW homepage* at <http://www.garobi.ang.af.mil/History/history.htm> ; internet; accessed 25 January 2006.
- ¹⁹ Air Land Sea Application Center, *JSTARS Multi Service TTPs*, (Langley AFB, Va.: ALSA, March 2003), I-1.
- ²⁰ *Glossary Terminology Related To Operations Involving Civilian and Military Resources* (Draft) (Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria Va, 26 January 2006), IV-10.
- ²¹ *Reserve components, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part 1, Chapter 1003, Section 10101* linked at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00010101----000-.html ; internet, accessed 18 Jan 2006.
- ²² *Ready Reserve, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part 1, Chapter 1005, Section 10145* linked at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00010145----000-.html ; internet, accessed 18 Jan 2006.
- ²³ *Reserve components generally, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part I1, Chapter 1209, Section 12301* linked at

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012301----000-.html ;internet, accessed 18 Jan 2006.

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²⁵ Article 802 Section A of UCMJ linked at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm#802.%20ART.%202.%20PERSONS%20SUBJECT%20TO%20THIS%20CHAPTER> ; internet ; accessed 22 January 2006.

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²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics FY04* (Department of Defense, Washington D.C.) report AO pg 1.005.

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³⁰ “USAF Talking points on FTF”, Linked from Future Total Force home page at <https://www.futuretotalforce.hq.af.mil/> ; internet; accessed 27 Jan 2006.

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³² U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Manpower and Organization*, AFD 38-1, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1 June 1996).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

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⁴⁴ Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Dov Zakheim .

⁴⁵ USAF Talking Points on FTF.

⁴⁶ USAF Talking points on FTF.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of the Air Force, *USAF Strategic Planning Directive for 2006-2023*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force,), 29.

⁴⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), 1.